CM(2004)14 26 January 2004
876 Meeting, 17 March 2004
11 Administration and Logistics
11.3 Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration (CCR)
Regulations concerning the Co-ordination system
154th Report – Report by the CCR Chairman
Cover note to the CCR Chairman's report
This report is highly important since it pertains to the reform of the fundamental rules that govern the functioning of the co-ordination system, i.e. the revision of the Regulations concerning the co-ordination system which came into force in 1991.
Since a CCR consensus could not be reached on a new set of Regulations for the co-ordination system, I have issued a Chairman's report in compliance with Article 5 (h) of the current Regulations concerning the co-ordination system.
The Chairman's report is separated into two parts: the body of the Report and the Regulations recommended in Annex I. The body of the Report contains a brief description of the events leading up to this Report. Annex I to the Report contains the new Regulations concerning the co-ordination system which met with the approval of all CCR delegations but two. These new Regulations can also be broadly accepted by both of the other Committees of Co-ordination, namely the management and staff. The positions of these two Committees on the new Regulations are shown in the body of the Chairman's Report. Annex II to the Report includes the positions of the two CCR delegations that could not join the consensus on the revised Regulations.
Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration
Regulations concerning the Co-ordination system
1. In 2002, the Councils of the Co-ordinated Organisations instructed their management teams to look into ways in which improvement might be made to the co-ordination system which had, for some time, shown flaws in its functioning. The current procedures are based on the Regulations concerning the co-ordination system, in force since July 1991.
2. As a consequence, the Committee of Representatives of Secretaries/Directors-General (CRSG) commissioned a group of three independent remuneration experts to carry out a review of the co-ordination system. In the course of their review the experts held interviews with participants in the three Committees of Co-ordination [the Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration (CCR), the CRSG and the Committee of Staff Representatives (CRP)]. The result of their review was a report by the experts' group [CCR/CRSG/CRP/WD(2003)8/REV1] which stated that co-ordination should be continued, but that the process needed to be reformed to survive. It also provided a number of proposals for improvement which were discussed in several sessions of co-ordination, either in each college alone, in bilateral or in tripartite meetings.
3. Starting from a draft by the German CCR delegation, which itself was based on the current Regulations and on proposals made by the experts' group, a set of new Regulations was produced.
4. Although at the meeting on 4-5 December 2003 a consensus emerged on this set of new Regulations of all the nine delegations who were present, I must record that the Italian and Russian delegations, which were not present at that meeting, confirmed their previously expressed position that they could not join consensus on the revised Regulations. Their positions are included in Annex II.
5. In the absence of consensus, the CCR Chairman is required, under Article 5 (h) of the current Regulations relating to the co-ordination system, to submit his Report to the Governing bodies of the different views expressed in the CCR, outlining as far as possible the broad lines of consensus.
6. Discussions on reform of the co-ordination system began before the end of 2002. The final discussions took place during sessions of the CCR and in tripartite sessions on 18-20 November and on 4-5 December 2003. The largest share of the Committees' time, and the most difficult discussions, concerned the following four issues: (i) the final decision-making process, (ii) the possibility for framework recommendations which would allow some flexible implementation in each Organisation, (iii) case-by-case exceptions to Regulations, and (iv) the introduction of a concertation group.
7. On all these issues the CCR came close to consensus with two delegations unable to join the common position. Both the other parties in the broader process, the CRSG and the CRP, were also able to support the agreement on the four points mentioned in paragraph 6. On (i) the CCR agreed that when making Recommendations to Councils, it would strive to the extent possible to reach consensus with the CRSG; on (ii) and (iii) see paragraphs 9 and 10 below; on (iv) in order to inject more transparency and trust into the process, small tripartite concertation groups will both prepare discussions in the larger forums and attempt to bring difficult discussions to a successful conclusion.
8. In the discussions between the Committees, there were two main issues which CCR delegates did not wish to see written into the new Regulations, but nevertheless wanted me to inform the Councils of CCR's views on them. The CRSG and the CRP were content with that solution. The issues are the following:
9. The first point concerned the CRP's possibility of putting forward for discussion proposals for the co-ordination process, through the CRSG [vide Article 5 (b)]. The second addressed the issue of flexibility both as a framework and in dealing with case-by-case exceptions.
10. Flexibility which takes the form of a framework applicable to all Organisations [vide Article 1 (b)] will allow each Organisation to adopt implementing provisions to meet its specific needs, it being jointly agreed by the CCR, CRSG and CRP that the permitted variations: (i) are consistent with the purpose of the policy in question, (ii) do not alter any of its essential parameters, and (iii) can be implemented and managed without significantly higher costs or general increases or reductions in remuneration levels.
11. Concerning the case-by-case exceptions, the Executives of each Organisation will be allowed to make exceptions to the adopted rules in individual cases on matters falling within the scope of co-ordination without first consulting the CCR, where strict application of the rules would otherwise cause special hardship to a staff member. Such exceptions shall be permitted by inserting in the rules of each Organisation a provision allowing the Secretary/Director-General to deal with these hardship cases where such flexibility did not already exist.
12. Although the above points are not specifically included in the new Regulations, the CCR intended that they should be used as a guide for dealing with questions that require a more flexible approach to implementing provisions and in exceptional cases that would otherwise cause hardship to a staff member. However, while keeping in mind the divergence between the Organisations, the CCR will also make a point of striving in future to co-ordinate to the maximum extent possible the remuneration system of the Organisations.
13. By agreeing with these new Regulations, the CCR with the exception of two delegations, has now responded to the Councils' concerns on reform of the co-ordination process. Furthermore, the reform has been carried out in a way that also has the broad agreement of the other parties to co-ordination. One of the conclusions of the experts' group was that a change of mind set was necessary for co-ordination to work. The final outcome and excellent atmosphere after the last meeting on this issue indicated that there was an opening of minds and that mutual confidence could be restored between the three Committees. I welcome this development and hope that the reform will provide an improved foundation for co-operation which will enhance the role of the CCR as the Councils' remuneration experts while keeping in mind the latters' different concerns and rapidly changing priorities.
Position of the CRSG
14. The CRSG welcomes the agreement that has been reached between the three parties on the Regulations concerning the co-ordination system. The CRSG notes that the new Regulations incorporate some key recommendations made by the group of experts commissioned by the CRSG to review the co-ordination system.
15. The CRSG hopes that these Regulations will help create a new form of co-ordination which better reflects the Co-ordinated Organisations' current realities and which can respond to their individual needs. In particular, the introduction of the concertation group and the emphasis on agreement between the parties on recommendations should contribute to a more efficient and transparent co-ordination process. The revised Regulations also provide for enhanced flexibility which the CRSG is confident will enable co-ordination to respond to diverging concerns of the Organisations.
16. The CRSG was impressed by the new spirit of openness and co-operation which marked the final stages of the discussion on the revised Regulations. The CRSG hopes that this can be continued and looks forward to balanced and fruitful discussions in co-ordination in the future.
Position of the CRP
17. The “Regulations concerning the co-ordination system” are an initial attempt by the CCR to react to the crisis that has shaken it throughout 2003 and threatened to undermine the way it operates and, in the long run, its very existence.
18. This recommendation is the outcome of a laborious trade-off within the CCR. Inevitably timid, it is only a very partial reflection of the recommendations by the three experts appointed by the CRSG, but is nevertheless a significant step in the right direction. In particular, the setting up of a “concertation group”, including representatives from each college and chaired by the CCR Chairperson, could enhance cohesion between the partners in the co-ordination process, and so help to make the entire system operate more harmoniously and efficiently.
19. As for “flexibility”, the CRP notes that this is limited to allowances and will be reserved for handling exceptional and clearly specified issues.
20. Such flexibility can only be introduced by the Organisations provided that they would have put in place in their own legal set-up tripartite consultation bodies equivalent to those in the co-ordination system.
21. The CRP would like to thank those national delegations which, by dint of their efforts to propose and mediate, have helped to get out of a dangerous status quo. More broadly, however, it would like to stress that there is far less dialogue and negotiation between management and staff in the Co-ordinated Organisations than in public services in democratic countries.
22. The Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration recommends to Councils:
- to adopt the revised Regulations concerning the co-ordination system set out in the Regulations in Annex I.
These Regulations shall come into force when adopted in identical terms by the Councils of the six Co-ordinated Organisations.
Regulations concerning the Co-ordination system
The following Regulations update those which came into effect on 1 July 1991.
For several decades, a co-ordinated system of remuneration has been maintained by a group of international organisations [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Space Agency (ESA), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Council of Europe, Western European Union (WEU) and the European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF)]. These Co-ordinated Organisations at present have more than 50 member States, 11 000 staff members, and 4 000 pensioners. The Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration (CCR) was established with a role of making recommendations on remuneration, allowances and pensions to the Councils of the Co-ordinated Organisations. The CCR works in conjunction with the Committee of Representatives of the Secretaries/Directors-General (CRSG) and the Committee of Staff Representatives (CRP). The legal and organisational basis for co-ordination is set out in the Regulations below.
Scope of Co-ordination
(a) The object of the co-ordination system is to provide recommendations to the Governing bodies of the Co-ordinated Organisations, in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations, concerning:
(i) Basic salary scales, and the method of their adjustment, for all categories of staff and for all countries where there are active staff or recipients of a pension;
(ii) Pension Scheme Rules;
(iii) The object, the amount and the method of adjustment of:
– expatriation allowance
– household allowance
– installation allowance
– dependent person's allowance
– daily subsistence allowance
– kilometric allowance
– expatriated child's allowance
– education allowance
– handicapped child's allowance.
(b) According to the procedure referred to in Article 6, recommendations to the Governing bodies are made by the Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration (CCR), to the extent possible in conjunction with the Committee of Representatives of Secretaries/Directors-General (CRSG) and after consultation with the Committee of Staff Representatives (CRP). Where divergent conditions exist in different Co-ordinated Organisations, recommendations on allowances may take the form of frameworks applicable to all the Organisations, within which each Organisation shall have the flexibility to adopt implementing provisions to meet its specific needs. The CCR shall be kept informed of these provisions.
(c) According to the procedure referred to in Article 6, the CCR shall give its advisory opinion on any question falling within its mandate asked by the Governing body of any Co-ordinated Organisation.
Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration (CCR)
(a) Each member State of one of the Co-ordinated Organisations may nominate one representative to the CCR who may be assisted by alternate delegates and advisers.
(b) The CCR shall elect its Chairperson by consensus for a three-year mandate extendible on a yearly basis, after consultation with the CRSG and after being informed of the views of the CRP.
(c) The Chairperson of the CCR shall act as the impartial Chairperson of the whole co-ordination process and shall look after its harmonious, rapid and efficient functioning.
(d) The Chairperson shall be assisted by one Vice-Chairperson elected annually by the CCR.
(e) The CCR may designate one of its members to act as its spokesperson.
Committee of Representatives of the Secretaries/Directors-General (CRSG)
(a) The Secretary/Director-General of each Co-ordinated Organisation shall appoint one representative to the CRSG who may be assisted by alternate delegates and advisers.
(b) The Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the CRSG shall be designated according to the procedures established by the CRSG.
(c) The Chairperson of the CRSG shall act as its spokesperson.
(d) The Secretaries/Directors-General may meet as the Committee of Secretaries/Directors-General (CSG).
(e) The CRP shall be given the prior possibility to outline to the CRSG any subjects related to remuneration policy which they consider should be raised at the sessions of the CSG.
The Committee of Staff Representatives (CRP)
(a) The representative statutory body of the staff of each Co-ordinated Organisation and the Association of Pensioned Staff of the Co-ordinated Organisations and of their Dependants (AAPOCAD) may appoint one delegate to the CRP as well as the alternate delegates and advisers who may accompany him/her.
(b) The Chairperson of the CRP shall act as its spokesperson. He/she may be assisted by a Vice-Chairperson.
Proposals and work programme
(a) The CCR shall adopt a detailed work programme, the draft of which is drawn up by its Chairperson in consultation with the CRSG and the CRP, of all items to be discussed in the next calendar year. This approved work programme shall include the timetable for considering all items mentioned therein. The Secretaries/Directors-General shall submit, each with his/her own comments if appropriate, the CCR work programme to the Governing body of each Co-ordinated Organisation for information and possible suggestions.
(b) The CRSG, after consultation with the CRP, may make proposals relating to matters which fall within the competence of the CCR as defined in Article 1 above, and present them to the CCR accompanied by any comments and views of the CRP.
(c) Any member of the CCR may make proposals to the CCR. After appropriate consultations, the Chairperson of the CCR shall decide which proposals have broad support amongst member States and therefore shall be brought forward for discussion in the joint meetings.
Recommendations and advisory opinions
(a) Recommendations, in the form of reports, shall be made by the CCR by consensus and, to the extent possible, in conjunction with the CRSG. The CRP shall be consulted on the draft reports with a view to considering its position.
(b) If no agreement can be reached between the CCR and the CRSG after two meetings following the submission of the proposal, the CCR will issue a report which will reflect the reasons for disagreement and set out dissenting opinions of the CRSG and comments of the CRP. However, discussions concerning the remuneration adjustment method may take longer and could require three meetings.
(c) If no agreement can be reached among the CCR delegates after two meetings following the submission of the proposal, the Chairperson of the CCR shall draft a report in which he/she shall set out the positions that have the largest support of the CCR. Dissenting opinions of CCR delegates as well as the opinion of the CRSG and comments of the CRP shall be set out in the body of the report.
(d) Proposals by the CRSG which are considered non-controversial by the Chairperson of the CCR may be submitted to the CCR through a written procedure. In this case, recommendations shall be considered as accepted by the CCR if no objection has been brought to the attention of the Chairperson of the CCR. Normally any such objection should be brought to his/her attention within three weeks of the notification of the recommendations to the members of the CCR, or before such other deadline as may be set by the Chairperson of the CCR which should be not less than five working days.
(e) Advisory opinions of the CCR shall be made by consensus after consultation of the CRSG and the CRP representatives from the Organisation(s) concerned. In case the subject in question is specifically related to one or more Organisations, the CCR delegations whose country is not a member of the Organisation(s) concerned will exercise due restraint in discussions on the adoption of the opinion. If no agreement can be reached among the CCR delegations after two meetings following submission of the request for an opinion, the Chairperson of the CCR shall draft a report in which he/she shall set out the advisory opinion which has the largest support in the CCR. Dissenting opinions provided in writing shall be annexed to the report.
Concertation group and formal and informal sessions
(a) The CCR, CRSG and CRP shall establish a concertation group which will be held as needed, in a flexible manner, either as a preparatory step to open discussion, or as a final attempt to achieve a meeting of minds among the Committees. The concertation group shall be limited to two representatives of each Committee. It shall be chaired by the Chairperson of the CCR. The representatives of the Committees will be expected to take into due account the positions of all their members during discussions in the concertation group.
(b) The CCR, the CRSG and the CRP may meet together, separately or any two together in formal or informal sessions. The Chairperson of the CCR shall act as Chairperson whenever the CCR meets with the CRSG or with the CRP.
Notification and implementation
(a) The Chairperson of the CCR shall notify the Secretaries/Directors-General of all reports, recommendations and advisory opinions. The Secretaries/Directors-General shall transmit these reports, recommendations or advisory opinions, to the Governing body of their Organisations, as soon as possible.
(b) The Governing body of each Co-ordinated Organisation shall decide on the reports, recommendations and advisory opinions made to it by the CCR.
(c) The Secretary/Director-General of each Organisation shall be responsible for the implementation of the decisions.
Members and Observers
(a) The Governing bodies of the Co-ordinated Organisations may, after having sought the advice of the CCR, accept unanimously that other international organisations participate in the system of co-ordination as members or observers.
(b) An international organisation may only become a member of the co-ordination system upon approval by its Governing body of the decisions concerning co-ordination then in force.
(c) When an international organisation has been admitted to participate in the system of co-ordination as an observer, the agenda, minutes and documents of the CCR, CRSG and CRP shall be provided respectively to its member countries, Secretary or Director-General and representative statutory body of its staff. Their representatives shall attend as observers the meetings of the CCR, CRSG and CRP.
(d) The Governing body of any Co-ordinated Organisation may decide to terminate the application of these Regulations to that Organisation by giving one calendar year's notice to that effect. It will transmit such a decision to the other Co-ordinated Organisations. In such instance, these Regulations will remain applicable as far as the other Co-ordinated Organisations are concerned.
Entry into force
These Regulations shall enter into force when approved by the Governing bodies of the six Co-ordinated Organisations. On such date, the Regulations concerning the co-ordination system dated 1 July 1991 shall be replaced by the present Regulations. After three years of operation of the system, these Regulations may be reviewed by the Governing bodies of the Co-ordinated Organisations.
Position of the Italian Delegation
Having learnt of the proposal [CCR/CRSG/CRP/WD(2003)17/REV4] sanctioning the role of the CCR as a representative body, the Italian Delegation feels bound to express its opinion on the said document.
The Italian Delegation is unable to approve the recommendation on the revision of the Regulations concerning the co-ordination system, for the following reasons which have to do with both form and substance.
A) Reasons of form
It has to be said, in the first place, that there are no real grounds for such far-reaching changes in the Regulations on co-ordination, especially regarding the reduction in the role and prerogatives of the CCR.
As a matter of fact, it is not clear to us that there really is a crisis of co-ordination; rather, there is a conflict of interests between national delegates and Secretaries-General, and this conflict cannot be solved by one party alone, notably the Secretaries-General who are obviously inclined to favour Regulations that are more in line with their own interests.
The fact is that the idea of reform came from the Secretaries-General who entrusted three experts with the task of reforming co-ordination. As far as principles go, an initiative of this sort ought to come from Councils or be delegated to the CCR, in line with the existing consultation procedures.
The report that the Chairperson wants to send to Councils does not appear to comply with the rule set out in Article 5 (h) of the present Regulations, which provides for a report by the Chairperson instead of a recommendation “in the event that no consensus has been reached after an item has been examined at three joint meetings of the CCR”. In the present case, the proposal of the Secretaries-General on the reform of co-ordination has been discussed just once – at the meeting of 19 November 2003 – given that the meeting of 4 and 5 December has to be considered to have been informal and in any case not scheduled in the summary record of 19 November 2003 [CCR/CRSG/CRP/M(2003)4].
B) Reasons of substance
To begin with, the Italian delegation should stress that the subject on which the CCR has been working for the past year is exactly the same as the one which has been talked about since the beginning of the discussions on the reform of co-ordination. What was involved was establishing, in the interest of the smooth functioning of co-ordination, a new balance between the different Committees, while at the same time respecting each Committee's prerogatives and especially – where the CCR is concerned – the respect of the representation of national interests.
This is the approach that has always been adopted by delegates to the CCR – ever since the compilation of the three or four questionnaires on this subject was first drawn up.
However, the Italian delegation greatly regrets that the results obtained are exactly the opposite, inasmuch as the recommendations on remuneration that are submitted to the Governing bodies of the Co-ordinated Organisations de facto remain – according to what is proposed in the new Regulations – in the hands of the CRSG, i.e. the employees, even though it is the CCR that represents the employers and the payers.
Also, the eternal conflict between the CCR delegates, the CRSG and the CRP is likely to be accentuated by giving the Governing bodies the power to propose and, at the same time, to co-operate with the recommendations of the CCR.
In the opinion of the Italian Delegation, it is obvious that the best way of making the co-ordination process quicker and more efficient would have been to confirm and consolidate the CCR's institutional position instead of cancelling out its powers by introducing new legal categories in the Regulations, namely: joint decision-making with the Secretaries-General, permanent delegation of powers and the authority to manage the process vested in the Chairperson and the concertation group in the absence of agreement between delegates and between the CCR and the CRSG.
The Articles in the new Regulations which, in substance, give more decision-making power to the Governing bodies (CRSG) and the CCR Chairperson are the following, in particular:
Article 1 (b) and Article 6 (a)
In terms of principle, recommendations – even though made by the CCR by consensus – shall be formulated and adopted jointly with the CRSG.
Article 1 (b)
The CCR permanently delegates to the Governing bodies in the sense that, in the event of divergent conditions in different Co-ordinated Organisations, each Organisation shall have the authority to adopt its own provisions within the framework of the general provisions concerning allowances.
Article 6 (b) and (c)
It is provided that either the CCR or the Chairperson of the CCR will issue a report, first in the event of disagreement between the CCR and the CRSG and, second, in the event of failure by the CCR delegates to reach agreement; this instead of a recommendation by the CCR.
Article 2 (b) and (c)
It should be stressed, in connection with the application of the preceding articles, that the CCR Chairperson is elected by the CCR, after consultation with the CRSG, and is paid out of the OECD-IOS budget.
He must act in the interests of the three Committees (CCR – CRSG – CRP) and look after the harmonious, rapid and efficient functioning of the co-ordination process. However, the CCR Chairperson cannot decide on questions of principle in lieu of national delegates.
Article 7 (a)
As a final attempt to achieve a meeting of minds among the Committees, Article 7 (a) provides for a concertation group which completely excludes the CCR from the co-ordination process inasmuch as it, the CCR, is just one of the three components.
Article 8 (a)
In view of the fact that the Secretaries-General shall transmit CCR reports to the Governing bodies of their Organisations as soon as possible, this undefined term makes it again possible to postpone notifying the Governing bodies of the CCR's recommendations sine die (it will be remembered that the same practice was employed in the past when it was a matter of forwarding the recommendation on the reform of the Pension Scheme).
In terms of principles, recommendations concerning the reform of co-ordination are the prerogative of national delegates alone who, as they represent national interests in the different international organisations, decide by consensus. It is for this reason that the report by the Chairperson and the new Regulations prompted by an initiative of the Secretaries-General, are not justified and the report is, in any case, not in compliance with the current Regulations and especially Article 5 (h).
It is national delegations alone that are qualified to assess increases in payroll expenditures and their compatibility with national budgets and compliance with the social and economic parameters laid down by the European Union, whose implementation is also recommended by the OECD.
In this context, remuneration policy needs to be looked at with an open mind, with respect for the economic and social situation prevailing in Member countries and on the basis of the principle of real parallelism between national pay scales and those applying to the staff of international organisations.
To conclude, the Italian Delegation is not in a position to approve the report by the CCR Chairperson and the new Regulations proposed by the Secretaries-General.
D) Proposal by the Italian Delegation
The compromise solution proposed by the Italian Delegation is to leave the existing Regulations on co-ordination unchanged, but to speed up the decision-making process in the CCR by means of a series of measures which would involve:
- improving (as the previous, French Chairman of the CCR tried to do) the functioning and structure of the CCR with the professional help of experts to whom studies could be entrusted. This would mean increasing the number of establishment posts in the Inter-Organisations Study Section on Salaries and Prices – the OECD/IOS;
- to this end, increasing the number of specifically budgeted OECD/IOS posts, particularly since they have been gradually reduced, making it more difficult to entrust experts with new tasks;
- the drafting of CCR proposals with the help, where necessary, of experts, especially when it comes to remuneration adjustment methods. To this end the IOS budget ought, as is stated above, to have sufficient appropriations over the coming years to be able to hire the services of experts, while the IOS should play only a technical role in developing studies and proposals along the lines laid down by the CCR. It is obvious that the CRSG and the CRP should be consulted on proposals put forward by the Committee, as is required by the existing Regulations;
- the CRSG accelerating the presentation of CCR recommendations to Councils, with precise timetables being laid down involving, in any event, a period of less than 20 days from the CCR's approving the recommendations;
- revising the internal regulations on the application of the existing Regulations with a view to clarifying the procedure to be adopted.
Position of the Russian Delegation
The Russian delegation is not in a position to associate itself with the recommendation on the revision of Regulations concerning the co-ordination system for the following reasons.
First, it considers that the present state of affairs in the CCR and the way it functions does not warrant a drastic review of Regulations and subsequent disruption of the existing procedures related to the decision-making mechanism in the CCR.
The notions of “crisis” and “criticism” in relation to the CCR's functioning as well as the urgency of a reform were artificially created by the CRSG and thrown-in in Councils after the CCR had not agreed with a number of CRSG's proposals, in particular with the introduction of a composite index (which was intended to follow inter alia private sector salaries) into the salary adjustment methodology.
Second. The concept of CCR/CRSG joint recommendations to Councils is not acceptable to the Russian delegation as a principle. It considers that since the exclusive responsibility to set salaries to staff lies with Councils the same approach should be maintained in the CCR where Member States representatives are responsible for formulating recommendations to Councils following appropriate consultations with staff and management. The introduction of a two-tier consultative/negotiation procedure - consultations with the CRP and joint decision-making with the CRSG - disrupts the tripartite consultative process and involves the CCR in de facto bilateral negotiations with the CRSG. This is not appropriate in the context of international organisations and, on the other hand, will certainly slow down the process of formulating recommendations to Councils which seems to be the main criticism of the CCR.
Third. The delegation of CCR's authority to concertation groups (as in draft Regulations being presented to Councils) is unjustifiable and non transparent from the point of view of procedure and will infringe on the right of Member States representatives in the CCR to exercise their decision-making responsibility. The Russian delegation considers that existing Regulations pertaining to the establishment of joint working parties [Article 5 (i)] are largely sufficient to cover all the needs of a tripartite consultative process.
Fourth. The Russian delegation cannot agree with the procedure chosen for the review of Regulations which does not comply with the Article 5 (h) rule for the adoption of recommendations by the CCR and the submission of Chairman's reports. In fact new draft Regulations were discussed only once: at the CCR meeting on 18-20 November 2003. Draft Regulations being proposed to Councils issue from an informal tripartite meeting (4-5 December 2003) in which a number of delegations (including the Russian delegation) were unable to participate. Thus, this non compliance with the existing procedures and a hasty presentation of draft Regulations to Councils deprived some delegations of the possibility to take part in deliberations as well as of their right to exercise their decision-making responsibility.
The other consequence of that way of dealing with the review of Regulations is that draft Regulations being presented to Councils contain a number of contradictions as to the procedures as well as of formulations subject to different interpretations which is not helpful in terms of improving the functioning of the co-ordination system.