Strasbourg, 26 January 2009 LR-IC(2009)3
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEMOCRACY
(CDLR)
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON LOCAL AND REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND CO-OPERATION
(LR-IC)
MUNICIPAL COMPETENCES
ANALYTICAL TOOL FOR ASSESSING THE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
OF FIRST-TIER LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Secretariat Memorandum
prepared by the Directorate General of
Democracy and Political Affairs
Directorate of Democratic Institutions
Introduction
Further to the detailed comparative study of municipal competences prepared by the consultant, Prof. Marcou (University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne/France), and adopted by the CDLR in December 2007 with a view to its publication in 2008, the CDLR agreed to continue the work in this area by developing an analytical tool for assessing the degree of autonomy of first-tier local authorities (including their co-operation/inter-municipal bodies).
After the first tests by Finland and Spain in 2006 having led to a substantial revision of the tool during the period 2007/2008, the consultant submitted a simplified version of the analytical tool to the LR-GI committee at its meeting of 13-14 October 2008. This new version comprises a detailed user’s guide, a scoring (points) system to be used to quantify – for four competence profiles – the extent of the competences exercised by local authorities, on the one hand, and the powers and resources at their disposal on the other. At the same time the consultant presented the results of a first application of the new tool to France, which had been conducted in close co-operation with the Directorate General for Local Authorities (DGCL) of the French Ministry of the Interior. Following the presentation of the new tool and after having judged the first results of this exercise interesting, the LR-GI committee decided that it would be useful to continue the tests “on the ground” so as to assess the tool’s manageability on a larger scale.
In order to facilitate both the task of the participating countries and follow-up by the consultant, it was decided that the next tests be conducted by (with) the countries covered by the first study on local authorities’ competences. Amongst the countries concerned, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (England) volunteered for testing the new tool according to a methodology to be decided; Austria also joined the activity without having participated in the first study.
It is suggested to open the testing phase according to the following principles:
- All countries having volunteered would start, from now on, applying the tool to their national situation by analysing the degree of autonomy of their local authorities, in order to forward the first results of their studies to the Secretariat before 30 April 2009.
- Each national expert concerned (LR-IC member or other expert appointed by the ministry) will be able to contact the CDLR Secretariat or the consultant directly in case of any questions or specifications required throughout the exercise.
- The delegations concerned, whose contact details have been listed, form a “network” in which they can contact each other for bilateral technical exchanges.
- If judged useful by participating delegations, it would be possible to organise a workshop in the run-up to the next LR-IC meeting of 11-12 June 2009 in order to discuss, in more depth, the first results obtained and the follow-up to be given to this activity.
See also the details of the proposed methodology in Appendix I.
The analytical tool to be applied during the testing phase can be found in Appendix II.
The results of the analysis undertaken by France (first test carried out in 2008) can be found in Appendix III.
Action required
On the basis of the proposals set out in this document, the LR-IC and notably the delegations concerned are invited to adopt a methodology with regard to starting the “large scale test” of the analytical tool on the degree of autonomy of local authorities.
Other States not yet having joined the project but which would be interested in participating, either because they also appear in the detailed comparative study on local authorities’ competences (Germany, Italy, Portugal), or because the theme is topical in a national context, are invited to express their interest.
APPENDIX I
Methodology proposed for a large scale test of the analytical tool in several member States (spring 2009)
Title of the activity |
Development of an analytical tool for assessing the degree of autonomy of first-tier local authorities |
Objectives |
- Assess the degree of autonomy of first-tier local authorities (municipalities and intermunicipal bodies) according to four competence profiles (economic; social; town planning and environment; police and security); - Generate quantified results allowing for the comparison, at European level, of different degrees of autonomy of local authorities; - Open the debate on the key factors (both facilitating and limiting) of this autonomy in order to provide member States (central administrations) with elements to help them orient their future policies on the scope of action of local authorities, to re-examine the distribution of competences between different administrative levels and to facilitate the consideration of the issue of decentralisation in measures aimed at evaluating public policies |
State of progress of the activity in January 2009 |
- Tool ready to be applied to local authorities of member States - Testing phase to be started in several member States (notably those appearing in the 2007 report of Prof. Marcou on local authorities’ competences) in order to finalise the tool and generate first results |
Proposed Joint working programme |
- Adoption of a methodology by the LR-IC during its meeting of 9-10 February 2009 - Tests undertaken individually by member States according to the procedure proposed (see below) before 30 April 2009 - Presentation of the first results of the tests at the LR-IC meeting of 11-12 June 2009 as well as to the CDLR at its meeting of 21-23 September 2009 - Possibility of a workshop for an in-depth exchange between test participants (if judged necessary in addition to the more individual exchanges suggested below) - date to be agreed upon (ideally directly in the run-up to the next LR-IC meeting in June 2009) |
Suggested individual testing procedure for participating delegations |
- Each participating administration (ministry) will designate a civil servant with sufficient research experience for collecting any relevant information, co-ordinating the analytical work on the competence profiles and giving reasoned conclusions with regard to the extent of powers and the degree of autonomy caracterising the exercise of competences. - Administrations concerned may collaborate with national associations of local authorities to carry out the analysis and fill in the tables; the minstry will, however, remain the main contact in the context of the work undertaken in the CDLR and its sub-committees. - The Secretariat and the consultant may be contacted for further information on applying the method, either in the run-up to or during its application. - On the condition that persons concerned agree, the participating delegations constitute a “network” in which they may contact each other with regard to bilateral technical exchanges. |
States applying the tool to their national situation and contact persons |
France (tool already tested ; results presented in Appendix III) |
Ms Séverine REYMUND Bureau des structures territoriales Direction Générale des Collectivités locales Ministère de l'Intérieur 1 bis, place des Saussaies, F - 75800 PARIS Fax: (33) 01 49 27 49 79; E-mail: [email protected] |
Hungary |
Mrs Viktória ZÖLD-NAGY Department of Public Administration Offices, Notaries and State Authority, Ministry of Local Self-Governments and Regional Development József A. Str. 2 – 4, 1051 - BUDAPEST Tel: +36 1 999 4828 Fax: +36 1 441-1755 Email: [email protected] |
|
Netherlands |
Mr Auke van der GOOT, Senior Adviser European and Local and Regional Governance Unit Directorate-General for Governance and Kingdom Relations Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, P.O Box 20011, NL - 2500 EA THE HAGUE Tel: (31) 70 426 7386; Fax: (31) 70 426 7665; E-mail: [email protected] |
|
Spain |
Mr Daniel MANTEROLA, Conseiller Technique de la Sous-direction Générale des Relations de collaboration avec les Communautés Autonomes, Direction Générale de la Coopération Régional, Santa Engracia, 7, E - 28071 MADRID Tel: (34) 91 273 45 88; Fax: (34) 91 273 46 10; E-mail: [email protected] |
|
Sweden |
Mrs Helena LINDE, Ministry of Finance, Division for Local Government Affairs, SE – 103 33 STOCKHOLM Tel: (46) 8 405 15 29; Fax: (46) 8 20 61 96; E-mail: [email protected] |
|
United Kingdom |
Mr Paul ROWSELL, Deputy Director, Local Democracy, Department for Communities and Local Government, 5/A1, Eland House, Bressenden Place, LONDON SW1E 5DU, GB Tel: (44) 20 7944 4230; Fax: (44) 20 7944 4109; E-mail: [email protected] |
|
Consultant Contact details |
Prof. Gérard Marcou GRALE, Université Paris I (Panthéon Sorbonne) Centre Universitaire Mahler, 9 rue Mahler, 75181 PARIS, France Tél : (33 3) 20 90 74 51 / (33 1) 44 78 33 44 ; E-mail : [email protected] |
|
CDLR Secretariat Contact |
Mrs Maren Lambrecht-Feigl, Administrator, CDLR Secretariat Direction of Democratic Institutions Directorate General of Democracy and Political Affairs Tel : +33 (0)3 90 21 47 78 ; Fax: +33 (0)3 88 41 27 84; E-mail: [email protected] |
APPENDIX II
Analytical tool for assessing the degree of autonomy
of first-tier local authorities
Gérard Marcou
INTRODUCTION
Proposed method: background, objectives and target groups
The report on The Extent and Nature of Local Authority Powers and Responsibilities in Council of Europe Member States, written by Prof. Gérard Marcou and adopted by the CDLR in 2007, presents a new comparative approach to the powers and responsibilities of local authorities in Council of Europe member States.
What emerged from the report was an analytical method for assessing the degree of autonomy of first-tier local authorities (municipalities, including their co-operation bodies). The method is based on tables that cross-reference the substantive competences (functions) exercised to the powers and resources at local authorities’ disposal, taking into account the institutional constraints inherent in the various legal and political systems. A sectoral approach is adopted, bearing in mind that the degree of autonomy (or decentralisation) may vary considerably from one sector to another within the same country and proceeding on the principle that local powers and responsibilities (competences) may be analysed as a combination of four competence profiles conflating a set of functions exercised by local authorities. The user’s guide is set out below.
In particular, this dual analytical method facilitates more detailed analysis of shared competences, which constitute the largest category in all countries.
It is first of all proposed to national administrations responsible for local authorities who can expect the following results when using the method:
- Re-examine the distribution of competences between different administrative levels, in the light of an analytical grid based on international comparison;
- Position the system of competences of local authorities in the country with regard to other European countries;
- Facilitate exchanges and co-operation with neighbouring countries on the basis of a common methodology;
- Facilitate the consideration of decentralisation in approaches aimed at evaluating public policies.
Interested administrations should use this method by means of a mandate to a civil servant having sufficient experience and authority. The mandatary will co-ordinate the analytical work along competence profiles, then draw up and validate conclusions from the point of view of the extent of powers, as well as that of the degree of autonomy caracterising the exercice of competences.
This method may also prove to be interesting for several other types of users, beyond the Council of Europe and the Congress of local and regional authorities, such as:
- parliaments;
- associations of local authorities or locally elected representatives;
- specialised journalists;
- specialists in universities and the research field.
Analytical tables
Format and content of the tables
In concrete terms, the analytical method is based on the four competence profiles referred to in the report on local authorities’ powers and responsibilities: social affairs, economic affairs, town planning and environment, and police and security. A table is presented for each profile, in which substantive competences (functions) are broken down and linked to categories of powers and categories of conditions or relationships (supervision, contract) affecting the degree of freedom enjoyed by local authorities. The tables were established on the basis of the knowledge acquired about numerous European systems of local self-government and by seeking to anticipate the particular features of these systems in defining the content of the tables.
Owing to the method’s highly synoptic approach (replies are given in the form of symbols or just a few words), a “guide” is needed to assist the people responsible for filling in the tables and those subsequently wishing to use them.
Approaches tailored to each competence profile
The competence profiles vary in format. In the town planning and environment and police and security competence profiles, most functions take the form of legal, regulatory or individual acts. This makes it impossible to distinguish as clearly between functions, on the one hand, and powers and resources, on the other, as in the other two tables; a different matrix has therefore been adopted.
In the town planning and environment table, the columns show indicators for the degree of freedom enjoyed by local authorities in respect of the acts listed in the lines. In the police and security table, it seemed preferable for the columns to list possible types of police authority, divided into categories, while the lines show the various functions – including legal acts related to policing, insofar as they are directed at third parties – and the substantive fields making up this competence profile: public security, emergency services, public health and hygiene. Legally speaking, policing is also a cross-sectoral function, an aspect that cannot be reflected in the tables: there are numerous police powers associated with the town planning and environment field, for example. The approximation adopted here seems acceptable, however, given that the purpose of this study is to assess the degree of freedom with which local authorities fulfil their remit in the substantive fields of competence assigned to them.
Quantifying the degree of local autonomy
The tables are supplemented by a score “quantifying” the degree of local autonomy. Points for autonomy are awarded or subtracted on the basis of the information set out in the form of lines and tables; for a given competence profile, a country’s local authorities can then be positioned on a scale of local autonomy. Care must be taken, however: the assessment calculates a degree of autonomy, which may be combined with a measure of the extent of local authorities’ powers and responsibilities (corresponding to the scope of the competence profile in terms of the actual powers and responsibilities exercised by the local authorities in question); the performance and quality of the resulting administrative setup in specific sectors are not evaluated. The maximum degree of local autonomy is not always an optimum, as the utilisation of the tables will show.
“GUIDE” TO USING AND INTERPRETING THE TABLES
Glossary
Firstly, definitions should be given for certain terms that may be interpreted differently from one country to another:
Local authority |
a public law entity, freely administered by at least one body having been elected directly by the citizens of its territorial area of responsibility and exercising the competences attributed by law, under control of the State. Federal entities and autonomous regions are non local authorities. The notion of “territorial authority” is sometimes used as a synonym of “local authority”. |
Competence: delegated |
competence exercised by a local authority on behalf of a higher-level authority (such as the State or region), in accordance with directives or instructions issued by the latter |
Competence: shared (or sharing of competence) |
refers to a situation in which a higher-level authority enjoys operational or decision-making powers in the same field as the local authority in question; depending on the circumstances, the exercise of such powers may either be neutral in terms of the latter’s freedom of action or influence its decisions |
Competence: own |
competence exercised by a local authority on its own responsibility, in accordance with laws and regulations but not subject to directives or instructions from higher-level authorities; such competences may be mandatory, where their exercise is a statutory obligation, or optional, where their exercise depends solely on a decision by the competent local authority |
Co-operation agreement |
contract between public corporations on the organisation of a joint venture rather than an exchange of services |
Supervision: general/ specific |
a distinction is made between implementation of a general supervisory procedure relating to acts by local authorities and implementation of a subject-specific supervisory procedure |
Supervision: prior |
supervision exercised before an act has taken effect, including explicit or tacit prior approval, or the taking of measures by a higher-level authority in the place and on behalf of the local authority in question (in the event of the latter’s failure to act) |
Supervision: subsequent |
supervision exercised once an act has taken effect, for instance the power to set it aside or refer it to a court with the power to set it aside |
Individual decisions a) mandatory b) discretionary |
a decision is mandatory if an administrative authority is obliged to take it where the conditions stipulated by law exist (this is checked in each case); it is discretionary if the law requires the administrative authority to assess each case, or where the administrative authority’s decisions are not subject to any requirements (a situation that is becoming less and less common) |
Financing, earmarked |
financing from budgetary revenue earmarked for a particular item of expenditure, as an exception to the principle of budgetary universality. In some countries, this may take the form of a supplementary budget covering revenue and expenditure specific to a particular department, in which case the supplementary budget is based primarily on revenue from users, with budgetary assistance constituting a secondary source of revenue |
Housing (policy) |
policy designed to meet housing needs, in terms of both the location and composition of housing stock; ensures that housing is incorporated into town planning policies |
Non-ministerial national (regional) body |
administrative authority or public or private body to which the law has entrusted certain powers within the purview of one or more ministries, and which has a nationwide (or regional, if applicable, in the case of a federal State or one with autonomous regional entities) geographical remit |
Planning |
planning meets a need for projection and co-ordination; it takes the form of a document, or set of documents, serving as a basis for individual or specific decisions in a given geographical area or sphere of activity, or both |
Regulatory power |
power assigned to an administrative authority to lay down general legal rules; in some countries, this comes within what is known as standard-setting power, which can take a number of forms (including the power to make laws or issue administrative regulations); in the tables below, a distinction is made in respect of each field according to the purpose of the regulatory power |
Deconcentrated departments |
administrative authorities within a local area which are subordinate to central or regional government, and to which certain decision-making powers are delegated |
Standards |
norms intended to guide their addressees’ behaviour, but not specifying an obligation to act or not to act. An example might be: “to ensure the regular, punctual operation of buses and the comfort of travellers”, which can be evaluated using specified indicators |
Expected replies
The tables are designed for simple replies:
- yes/no;
- using the symbols indicated when options are given at the head of the column or line:
· letters in the columns (a, b, c, etc.);
· figures in the lines (1, 2, 3, etc.);
- using a single word, or a few words if necessary.
The number of points may also be noted directly in the box.
The method allows flexible replies designed to accommodate specific national features and complex „on the ground“ situations:
In many cases, more than one reply can be given simultaneously, for example:
- where the local authority is able to regulate both the organisation of the function in question and the procedure for securing certain rights, and to set standards (see tables 1 and 2, column 5);
- where the function is financed by charging users a fee set by the local authority (see tables 1 and 2, column 12).
In some cases, the table calls for combined replies (for example, columns 13 and 14 of tables 1 and 2: supervision of legality or expediency, where it exists, is necessarily prior or subsequent in nature). Insofar as such an approach makes sense, the proposed replies are set out in order of increasing freedom for local authorities.
The lines are often divided into sub-headings, in which case a reply should be given for each sub-heading, according to the procedure described above, unless the sub-heading in question is not applicable, in which case the reply should be “n”.
Those filling in each table may amend the line or column headings as appropriate to their own country, giving an explanation in their comments.
Scoring: basic principle
The indicators given in the tables are used to develop a scoring (points) system reflecting the extent of local authorities’ substantive competence and the degree of autonomy they enjoy.
Scores must be calculated for each table; the tables cannot all follow exactly the same model, owing to the nature of the powers and responsibilities in question.
Firstly, information is obtained about the particular sectors covered: for example, the extent of local authorities’ powers and responsibilities depends on the number of applicable headings in the list of functions set out in the lines.
In practice, comparisons of the extent of local authorities’ powers and responsibilities should be confined to each competence profile, or even – to adopt a still more rigorous approach – to each line, since there is no way of weighting the breakdown of substantive competences by competence profile. Subject to this proviso, one point may be allocated for each section heading in the lines.
Points allocation and type of results obtained
Points for autonomy are allocated according to a scale drawn up for each column (see below). A slightly different method is used for competence profiles 3 and 4, however, given that as a rule it is impossible to separate substantive competences from specific legal powers.
A practical example: if we combine the measure of the extent of French municipalities’ competence with the degree of autonomy they enjoy, we find that they have limited competence in the public health field, but enjoy a greater degree of local autonomy in respect of outpatient care (an optional competence) than in respect of public hospitals, even though legally speaking the latter are local institutions. This is a minor competence exercised by French municipalities and their public institutions, but the same type of analysis can be applied to any competence.
The points allocation grid allows the competence in question to be positioned on a scale of autonomy (or freedom) in relation to the maximum number of points that could theoretically be allocated.
It should be emphasised that the method’s scope is strictly limited to its purpose: it enables us to ascertain the extent of the powers and responsibilities exercised by a country’s municipalities, within a given competence profile, and whether they enjoy a low or high degree of autonomy in the context of that profile. It is often the case, however, that extensive powers and responsibilities in a given area are coupled with a lesser degree of freedom, and that the greatest degree of autonomy is enjoyed in the least important areas or those of purely local interest (such as sport and leisure). Moreover, it is clear from the table that, in some cases, the maximum degree of autonomy may have undesirable effects: in the area of primary and secondary education, for example, nobody would want local authorities to have discretionary power when it comes to individual decisions about students.
It follows that the measure of the extent of local powers and responsibilities and the degree of local autonomy does not equate to an assessment of the proper organisation of the sector or function in question or the quality of its operation. Such assessments must be conducted by other means. Nevertheless, it is helpful to compare systems of local government and to position countries in relation to one another in terms of decentralisation (or the degree of autonomy enjoyed by local authorities), in such a way as to highlight differences between sectors as well.
The degree of decentralisation within a given competence profile may be assessed, therefore, by adding the number of points allocated for the extent of local authorities’ powers and responsibilities and the number of points allocated for autonomy. In order to facilitate the comparison, the scoring results will be ascribed a basis of 100, which will allow for a fair appreciation of values between the extent of powers and the extent of autonomy.
The number of points to be allocated are given prior to each of the tables set out below.
Limitations of the proposed analytical method
Before going on to discuss how the tables and their scoring systems apply to national situations, we ought to clarify the limitations of the proposed method.
While it is true that the tables are not intended to be comprehensive, the section headings and sub-headings were chosen because they are representative of both local powers and responsibilities and the variations found across Europe (see the aforementioned report on “The Extent and Nature of Local Authority Powers and Functions in Council of Europe Member States”).
It would be paradoxical, however, if the impression were given that systems in which local authorities exercise wide-ranging substantive competences, but in fields that are mandatory precisely because of their importance, appeared to be less decentralised. In order to avoid such an outcome without distorting assessments of the degree of freedom enjoyed in local decision-making, headings or sub-headings corresponding to mandatory competences count for two points rather than one in respect of the extent of local authorities’ powers and responsibilities. Such a convention is warranted only for the social and economic affairs profiles, however. In the case of the town planning and environment and police and security profiles, staff management may simply be dealt with as part of local self-government resources.
Likewise, in various fields – and specifically the main competences within the social affairs profile – responsibility for staff management is a key variable when it comes to assessing the extent of local authorities’ powers and responsibilities. In this case, therefore, points for the extent of powers and responsibilities should also be added where the competent local authority has responsibility for staff management. This convention is not incompatible with the inclusion of such responsibility as part of local self-government, provided that it is systematically followed, particularly in respect of all those countries to which the analytical matrix is to be applied.
Secondly, there is an issue that must be resolved as regards the interpretation of the column dealing with staff and facilities. The convention should be that this power is only included in respect of staff and facilities used directly to provide a service to the public, but not in respect of those used for general administration.
Lastly, it is important to bear in mind the institutional constraints arising from the impact that powers and responsibilities exercised by deconcentrated bodies, non-ministerial bodies answerable to central (or regional) government or other local authorities have on the exercise of local powers and responsibilities. Such sharing of competence may either be neutral in terms of its effect on the local authority in question, or reduce both the latter’s freedom of action and the extent of its powers and responsibilities. Replies should therefore reflect an assessment of this aspect.
A similar problem arises in relation to the power to raise taxes, which is a key component of local self-government. It appears in column 12, which assesses local authorities’ ability to modify the resources they commit in exercising their powers and responsibilities. It is a general power, however, unlike the power to charge fees, which always applies to a specific function. There is a case for having two separate columns, but this would be an unnecessary complication: 1) even in a separate column, the existence of the power to raise taxes would have to be noted in respect of each competence, since it contributes to the latter’s financing; 2) cases in which the power to raise taxes is exercised specifically in respect of a tax whose proceeds are earmarked for certain items of expenditure, in application of the law, would be left out. Given that the analytical tool focuses specifically on powers and responsibilities, the solution adopted seems preferable.
ANALYTICAL TABLES FOR FOUR COMPETENCE PROFILES
Table 1: Social affairs competence profile
Preliminary remarks
The table identifies substantive competences according to a standardised format. Details about the country in question should be specified in an appendix; where necessary, the line headings in the tables may be adapted. This applies, for example, to questions of the following type:
- whether families and children are covered by the same regulations as far as local powers and responsibilities are concerned;
- whether a distinction is made between the general social protection system and social welfare, or whether such a distinction does not exist;
- whether the distinction made in the table between different levels of education is relevant; if not, describe the specific situation.
Instructions for filling in the table
Columns 1 to 3 |
Background information designed to assess the extent to which powers and responsibilities are shared among three separate categories of institutions. Column 3 is confined to local authorities in the true sense; federated States and autonomous regions are covered in columns 1 and 2. |
Columns 4, 5 and 6 |
Closely inter-related information designed to assess the degree of freedom enjoyed by local authorities in the exercise of such powers; replies are set out in order of increasing freedom for local authorities; only one reply is possible in columns 3 and 5; more than one reply is possible in column 4 |
Column 7 |
Existence or otherwise of a planning function based on a text |
Column 8 |
Replies are weighted as follows: 1 point for an affirmative reply, 2 points for two affirmative replies, 0 points for no affirmative replies (see proposed weighting system further down) |
Columns 9 and 10 |
Column 9 requires a yes/no answer (can the local authority choose the form of management adopted in respect of the function in question?); column 10 ascertains whether the use of public- or private- sector enterprises is a legal requirement or one of the choices available. The public and private sectors are grouped together, since in either case the enterprise is outside the local authority’s control. |
Columns 11 and 12 |
Column 11 deals with how the function is funded; earmarked resources or financing by users or third parties are taken to indicate less autonomous management, since such financing is outside the local authority’s control; financing from the local authority’s general budget indicates a greater degree of autonomy, but is not secure and depends on the said authority’s total resources and expenditure; column 12 indicates whether the local authority has power to raise taxes and/or set fees |
Columns 13 and 14 |
Column 13 covers the purpose of supervision (legality or expediency), and column 14 its timing. Supervision confined to legality is regarded as neutral in terms of local autonomy, as is subsequent supervision, but supervision of expediency and prior supervision reduce the degree of local autonomy (-1) |
Column 15 |
Covers contracts or agreements with higher-level authorities (such as the State or region); specify the nature of the other contracting party; also state whether the signature of such contracts is optional or a statutory obligation. The existence of such contracts is neutral in terms of the degree of autonomy enjoyed by local authorities, as is, therefore, the ability to enter into them; one point is subtracted, however, for the obligation to enter into such contracts |
Scoring
Tables 1 and 2 use the same scoring system, which is therefore presented only once. In particular, in calculating the number of points allocated, a distinction is made between cases in which the score is graduated (only one reply possible), alternative (yes/no) or cumulative (more than one reply possible).
Scoring for tables 1 and 2
Column |
Subject |
No. of pts |
Comments |
1 to 3 |
Sharing of competence |
0 to -1 |
Graduated 0: the authority in question plays a monitoring role and participates in the supervision mentioned in columns 13 and 14, with no effect on local autonomy -1: the authority exercises decision-making power and/or plays an operational role which affects the exercise of local powers and responsibilities or reduces their scope |
4 |
Type of competence |
1 to 3 |
Graduated 1: where some form of competence is enjoyed; delegated competence corresponds to the lowest level of autonomy 2: mandatory own competence 3: optional own competence: in general, such competences are less significant but more autonomous |
5 |
Regulatory power |
0 to 2 |
Cumulative 0: no regulatory power 1: confined to organisational and sometimes procedural aspects 1: including the setting of service standards and the nature of entitlements/services |
6 |
Individual decisions |
0 to 2 |
Graduated 0: no power to take individual decisions 1: mandatory power 2: discretionary power In some cases, however, mandatory powers are more advantageous for those concerned |
7 |
Planning |
0 or 1 |
Alternative 0: no power to draw up plans 1: power to draw up plans |
8 |
Management and earmarking of resources |
0 to 2 |
Cumulative 0: no power 1: facilities, infrastructure 1: staff |
9 |
Choice of form of management |
0 or 1 |
Alternative 0: no choice 1: freedom of choice (even subject to restrictions) |
10 |
Delegation to the public or private sector |
0 or 1 |
Alternative 0: mandatory 1: optional |
11 |
Financing: sources |
0 to 2 |
Cumulative 1: local authority’s general budget 0: earmarked external financing, budget or third parties In the former case, local authorities are in control of financing, subject to the constraints of their own budgets; in the latter case, financing is secure but outside their control. 1: however, where third-party financing is coupled with fees set, at least to some extent, by local authorities |
12 |
Financing: powers |
0 to 2 |
Cumulative: 1: existence of power to raise taxes in their own right, regarded as significant in the light of financing needs (to be evaluated) 1: power to set fees, at least to some extent 0: no power to raise taxes or set fees |
13 |
Supervision: expediency or legality |
-1, 0 or +1 |
Graduated -1: supervision of expediency 0: supervision of legality +1: no supervision by a higher-level authority In this context, supervision is a power exercised by a higher-level authority: it may be considered to reduce the degree of autonomy (supervision of expediency) or to be neutral (compliance with the law is required in any case – in theory); the absence of supervision by a higher-level authority is considered to boost the degree of autonomy. This may have adverse effects (less compliance with the law), but that is not what we are attempting to measure here. |
14 |
Prior (ongoing) or subsequent supervision |
-1 or 0 |
Alternative -1: prior supervision reduces the degree of local autonomy 0: subsequent supervision is neutral |
15 |
Co-operation agreements |
-1 or 0 |
Alternative -1: an obligation to contract agreements reduces the degree of autonomy 0: the ability to contract agreements is neutral |
Total number of points that can be allocated |
16 |
This total represents the maximum degree of autonomy in respect of a given substantive competence; it is not the optimum score. Comparisons can then be drawn between the different substantive competences in terms of the degree of decentralisation, and between countries in respect of the same substantive competences. |
Table 1: Social affairs competence profile
Constraints, powers and resources Functions |
Sharing of competence |
Powers and resources |
|||||||||||||
1
|
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
14 |
15 |
|
Deconcentrated government departments (federated State or region in some countries) |
Non-ministerial body answerable to central (or regional) government |
Other local authorities |
Type of competence a) delegated b) own, mandatory c) own, optional |
Regulatory power a) organisation b) procedural aspects c) standards d) rights |
Individual decisions a) mandatory b) discretionary |
Planning |
Management and allocation of resources a) facilities b) staff |
Choice of form of management (yes/no) |
Delegation to public or private sector a) statutory obligation b) optional |
Financing a) earmarked b) fee-based, from outside org. c) general budget |
Financing a) power to raise taxes b) fees set by local authorities |
Supervision a) expediency b) legality |
Supervision a) prior b) subsequent |
Co-operation agreement a) mandatory b) optional |
|
1. Public health |
|||||||||||||||
-prevention |
|||||||||||||||
-outpatient care |
|||||||||||||||
-hospitals |
|||||||||||||||
2. Social services and benefits |
|||||||||||||||
-family |
|||||||||||||||
-children (protection, accommodation) |
|||||||||||||||
-elderly |
|||||||||||||||
-disabled |
|||||||||||||||
-minimum income |
|||||||||||||||
-integration |
|||||||||||||||
-welfare (relief) |
|||||||||||||||
3. Education |
|||||||||||||||
-primary |
|
||||||||||||||
-secondary |
|||||||||||||||
-compulsory |
|||||||||||||||
-vocational |
|||||||||||||||
-special (children with disabilities) |
|||||||||||||||
4. Culture |
|||||||||||||||
-artistic education |
|||||||||||||||
-museums |
|||||||||||||||
-libraries |
|||||||||||||||
-conservation |
|||||||||||||||
-theatres, shows |
|||||||||||||||
5. Sport and leisure |
|||||||||||||||
-sports facilities |
|||||||||||||||
-leisure centres |
Table 2: Economic affairs competence profile
Preliminary remarks
The difference between the substantive competences (functions) in table 1 (the social affairs profile) and those in table 2 (the economic affairs profile) lies in the predominantly market-based focus of profile 2, which is not a feature – or only to a marginal extent – of profile 1. This aspect does not coincide with the use of the private sector: in the social field, public authorities may also purchase services aimed at the general public which are not provided on a market basis; conversely, market services may be offered by local public enterprises, sometimes State-run.
Instructions for filling in the table
Columns: same comments as for table 1.
Explanation of the lines:
Line 3: “energy” |
- Renewable energies come under “electricity”, because they are generally primary energy sources (wind or solar). - Distribution is a network function, so it corresponds to the “facilities” function in the columns: in the case of France, for example, the fact that municipalities have to delegate the management of distribution networks (gas and electricity) to companies designated by the State (by law) means the answer should be “no” in the column headed “choice of form of management” and a) (statutory obligation) in the column dealing with delegation to the private sector (even though the companies in question are government corporations). |
Line 5: “public transport” |
The table is confined to local authorities’ powers and responsibilities, meaning that in some countries responsibility for regional links will not appear. In order to avoid a distorted picture resulting from the omission of certain information, it is possible to specify the competence of the regional authority and its nature. |
Line 6: “housing” |
Distinction between three different areas of competence: - local housing policy (see above glossary); - building and management of social housing; - allocation of social housing to eligible persons. |
Line 7: “measures to promote economic development” |
Heading that can cover various forms of action to promote economic development, including activities outside the economic sphere as such. It may be appropriate to highlight a specific function regarded as an instrument of economic development, provided that it is not included in another table (such as the one on town planning and environment). |
Scoring
The scoring system to be applied is the same as for table 1 (see above).
Table 2: Economic affairs competence profile
Constraints, powers and resources Functions |
Sharing of competence |
Powers and resources |
|||||||||||||
1
|
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
14 |
15 |
|
Deconcentrated government departments (federated State or region in some countries) |
Non-ministerial body answerable to central (or regional) government |
Other local authorities |
Type of competence a) delegated b) own, mandatory c) own, optional |
Regulatory power a) organisation b) procedural aspects c) standards d) rights |
Individual decisions a) mandatory b) discretionary |
Planning |
Management and allocation of resources: a) facilities b) staff |
Choice of form of management (yes/no) |
Delegation to public or private sector a) statutory obligation b) optional |
Financing a) earmarked b) fee-based, from outside org. c) general budget |
Financing a) power to raise taxes b) fees set by local authorities |
Supervision a) expediency b) legality |
Supervision a) prior b) subsequent |
Co-operation agreement a) mandatory b) optional |
|
1. Household services |
|||||||||||||||
-water |
|||||||||||||||
-sewerage |
|||||||||||||||
-household refuse: collection |
|||||||||||||||
-household refuse: treatment |
|||||||||||||||
-district heating |
|||||||||||||||
-telecom networks |
|||||||||||||||
2. Funerals and burials |
|||||||||||||||
-funeral service provision |
|||||||||||||||
-cemeteries |
|||||||||||||||
3. Energy -electricity *production, supply *renewable energies *distribution |
|||||||||||||||
-gas *production, supply *distribution |
|||||||||||||||
-energy conservation |
|||||||||||||||
4. Roads |
|
||||||||||||||
-building, maintenance, use |
|||||||||||||||
-parking |
|||||||||||||||
-public lighting |
|||||||||||||||
-management of ancillary premises |
|||||||||||||||
5. Public transport |
|||||||||||||||
-urban transport |
|||||||||||||||
-inter-urban transport |
|||||||||||||||
-regional links |
|||||||||||||||
6. Housing |
|||||||||||||||
-general |
|||||||||||||||
-building/management of social housing |
|||||||||||||||
-allocation of social housing |
|||||||||||||||
7. Measures to promote economic development |
|||||||||||||||
-business grants |
|||||||||||||||
-provision of sites |
|||||||||||||||
-economic infrastructure * ports, airports * other |
|||||||||||||||
-services to businesses (industrial waste disposal, etc.) |
Table 3: Town planning and environment competence profile
Preliminary remarks
Table 3 differs in format from the previous two tables, since most of the functions relate to legal powers. For instance, the section on powers and resources focuses primarily on aspects of the competent local authority’s relationships with other authorities and bodies in the sector in question. Supervision proper is covered in three separate columns.
Where a substantive competence (function) is associated with specific legal powers (such as the adoption of binding or non-binding plans or the issue of permits), a degree of autonomy is inherent in the powers conferred. This has certain implications for the way the score is calculated.
Instructions for filling in the table
Not every aspect is relevant to all the competences listed in the lines. Accordingly, the initial column indicates whether the competence in question is one exercised by first-tier local authorities (municipalities). The column cells are then filled in only if the aspect in question applies to that competence.
The background information appearing in columns 2 and 3 differs from that in tables 1 and 2, but serves the same purpose: ascertaining the limits of local competence.
Column 9: |
Relates only to the competences in sections 1, 4 and 5 of the lines; other competences are exercised as part of general administration. |
Column 10: |
Answer a) if a fee is levied. Then specify whether this fee is payable by the owner or the builder (letter b) or c): only one reply is possible save in exceptional cases, which should be explained). |
Columns 11 to 13: |
More than one reply may be given in each column. If several bodies enjoying supervisory powers are named in column 10, separate replies should be given for each in columns 11 and 12. |
Line 2 has been left blank: |
Replies to the questions asked in columns 2 and 3 may be of a general nature, i.e. unconnected to a particular function. However, answers should be given in line 2 only if they cannot be given in subsequent lines. |
Each of lines 2 to 6 |
corresponds to a separate main function in the town planning and environment profile; not all the aspects listed in columns 4 to 13 apply to every function, but answers in the columns should be given under the sub-headings set out in the lines. |
Scoring
Given that each substantive competence is associated with certain powers, one point for autonomy is allocated for each competence exercised. Accordingly, additional headings or lines should be added if there is not enough room in the table for competences considered significant; these will each count for one extra point for autonomy.
It is true that the “roads and services” heading (line 5) is presented as a separate substantive competence, as is the case in table 2, but in operational terms it comes under the planning competence. In some countries, however, it is the responsibility of national bodies outside local authorities’ control. The inclusion of this substantive competence here should highlight cases in which competence for planning is more limited (confined to amenities and sale of land) by indicating that it is not exercised by local authorities. It is also possible that local authorities may not have any powers or responsibilities in the area of planning.
The points allocated for the aspects listed in the columns may increase or decrease the degree of local autonomy associated with each line. As an example: where a country’s municipalities are responsible for drafting local plans prohibiting the granting of planning permission, 0 points will be added if municipalities can only prepare and propose plans, 1 point if this is a delegated competence (plans are adopted on behalf of a higher-level authority: central or regional government), 2 points if it is a mandatory own competence, or 3 points if it is an optional own competence.
As regards competence for issuing town planning permission, it is possible that a country’s legislation may allow only one type of permission. In this case, so as not to distort comparisons, each item identified in line 3 should be treated as a separate procedure. Where necessary, another type of authorisation may be added if it is not covered by those already listed in the table; this will count for an extra point for autonomy.
Scoring for table 3:
Column |
Subject |
No. of pts |
Comments |
|||
1 |
Existence of the competence |
1 |
One point if the local authority has this power; 0 or cell left empty if it does not. |
|||
A) Starting point: total number of points that can be allocated if all the substantive competences listed in the lines of the table are exercised |
13 |
This total will be higher if other functions are added. In the line dealing with plans, however, local and detailed plans will count for just one point, since the fact that the law provides for detailed plans does not appear to indicate a greater degree of autonomy in respect of town planning. |
||||
2 |
Derogation procedures |
-0.5 |
Half a point is subtracted if such procedures reduce the degree of local autonomy only when they are applied |
|||
3 |
Opposable plans (or subject to “relevant consideration”) issued by higher authorities |
-0.5 |
Higher-level plans reduce the degree of local autonomy but do not take away local authorities’ competence |
|||
4 |
Nature of competence |
0 to 3 |
Graduated 0: limited to proposal and drafting 1: delegated competence 2: mandatory own competence 3: optional own competence |
|||
5 |
Research/planning bodies answerable to local authorities |
0 or 1 |
Alternative 0: none 1: existence, since this contributes to autonomy Fill in only the cell(s) for the competence(s) concerned |
|||
6 |
Relationship between planning permission and plans |
1 or 2 |
Graduated 1: obligation to comply, since the plan’s effectiveness contributes to autonomy in respect of local town planning policy 2: discretion, which allows a greater degree of autonomy (for instance: UK = “relevant consideration”) Relates only to the lines under section 2 (planning permission) |
|||
7 |
Exercise of functions |
1 or 2 |
Graduated 1: competence exercised exclusively by local government (subject to column 4); administrative capacity contributes to autonomy 2: option of using private sector |
|||
8 |
Co-operation agreements |
0 or 1 |
Graduated: 0: no contracts 0: contracts between public corporations – neutral, because they can either contribute to autonomy or extend the sphere of competence, on the one hand, or reduce the degree of autonomy, on the other 1: development contracts with operators: this is a means of monitoring the activities of developers and builders, thereby boosting the degree of autonomy enjoyed by local authorities |
|||
9 |
Financing |
1 to 2 |
Cumulative 1: financing by means of earmarked grants – extending the resources available to the authority in the areas of planning and development, in particular 1: from the local authority’s general budget – it decides on its investment in respect of town planning and the environment |
|||
10 |
Financing by interested parties |
0 to 1 |
Alternative 0: no duty payable 1: duty payable – contributes to autonomous exercise of the competence; it should be assessed whether such duty is significant enough to be worth mentioning |
|||
11 |
Body with supervisory power |
0 |
Nature of the body has no effect on local autonomy |
|||
12 |
Supervision of expediency/legality |
-1 to +1 |
Alternative -1: supervision of expediency reduces the degree of autonomy 0: supervision of legality is neutral in terms of autonomy, since there is an obligation to comply with the law in any case (in theory) +1: no supervision, but lack of supervision may have an adverse impact See scoring table set out in par. 7.3 |
|||
13 |
Type of supervision: prior/ongoing/ subsequent |
-1 or 0 |
Alternative: -1: prior supervision reduces the degree of local autonomy 0: ongoing or subsequent supervision is neutral |
|||
B) Total number of points for autonomy that can be allocated in the columns |
13 |
|||||
A + B: Total number of points for autonomy for the town planning/ environment competence profile |
26 |
The maximum of 26 points is not the optimum score; it is simply the top of a scale on which local authorities may be positioned in terms of the degree of local autonomy they enjoy in respect of town planning. |
||||
Column 1 serves only to identify the existence of the power mentioned in the table, in order to show the number of points attributed concerning the material extent of powers in the profile. There are 13 rows corresponding to distinct powers, and therefore a maximum of 13 points is possible.
The columns allow for the attribution or deduction of points of autonomy. Taking into consideration the scale proposed in the table presented below, the maximum score is 13.
The maximal extent of powers and degree of autonomy related to these powers result in a total of 26 points, but as mentioned before, this maximum score is not an optimal score.
Table 3: Town planning and environment profile
Constraints, powers and resources Functions |
Background |
Powers and resources |
Administrative supervision |
||||||||||
1
|
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
|
Substantive competence enjoyed by local authorities |
Existence of derogation procedures under central/ regional supervision a) exceptional b) occasional |
Existence of a binding development plan issued by a higher-level authority a) principle b) exception |
Nature of competence a) own, optional b) own, mandatory c) delegated d) drafting/proposal |
Research/development bodies under local supervision |
Relationship between planning permission and plans: a) obligation to comply b) discretion |
Exercise of functions a) Local government: obligation b) Delegation to private sector: possible |
Co-operation contracts a) between public corporations b) with operators |
Financing a) earmarked grant from higher-level authority b) local authority’s general budget |
Funding by rights holders a) planning permission (or declaration) fees b) builders c) owners |
Exercised by: a) central government b) regional government c) general d) specific |
Purpose a) expediency b) legality |
Nature a) prior b) ongoing c) subsequent |
|
1. Plans |
|||||||||||||
land use, structural or strategic plans |
|||||||||||||
local plans prohibiting granting of planning permission |
|||||||||||||
detailed plans |
|||||||||||||
2. Permission |
|||||||||||||
-to develop |
|||||||||||||
-to divide into plots |
|||||||||||||
-to build |
|||||||||||||
-to demolish |
|||||||||||||
3. Land measures |
|||||||||||||
-expropriation |
|||||||||||||
-right of pre-emption |
|||||||||||||
-redistribution of urban land |
|||||||||||||
4. Planning |
|
||||||||||||
-roads and services |
|||||||||||||
-amenities and sale of land |
|||||||||||||
5. Establishment and maintenance of environmental/urban conservation areas |
Table 4: Police and security competence profile
Preliminary remarks
Several types of police authority are listed in the columns of the police and security table, so as to provide scope for recording the complex institutional arrangements often found in this field. In some countries, the reforms of recent decades have tended to result in a form of organisation involving specialised institutions over which local authorities no longer have sole control. The same applies to the emergency services.
The different authorities are listed in the columns, and their functions in the lines. The column covering central (or regional) government authorities is designed to highlight areas in which competence is shared and indicate the relative roles of local and higher-level authorities. The three columns dealing with supervision (5 to 7) place police and security competences within the context of the general institutional framework of local government.
Instructions for filling in the table and scoring
As in the town planning and environment profile, competences are associated with certain powers. In the police and security profile, the degree of local autonomy may be assessed according to the nature of the competent bodies and the supervision exercised as well as the type of functions assigned.
The lines list a number of powers; in some cases, restrictions are specified that will influence the subsequent replies. The police and security field is one in which the central government or higher-level authorities always enjoy some competence, however. What matters are the areas or powers assigned to local authorities, the scope of which is determined by law and cannot be measured in this kind of table; local competence should therefore be noted only where it is deemed significant enough to be representative of local powers and responsibilities in general. The aim here is to measure local powers and responsibilities in terms of the degree of autonomy, but not as an alternative to the competence exercised by central government or higher-level authorities.
Column 1 (central government authority) shows the competence enjoyed by central government in those areas in which local authorities also exercise powers and responsibilities. The aim is not to draw up a list of central government competences in the police and security field. Accordingly, the existence of central government competence is recorded with a 0, reflecting a neutral score when measuring local autonomy. If powers of the central government are competing with those of local authorities at local level, it is possible, however, to subtract one point from local autonomy, given the fact that central government powers will reduce the freedom of action of the local authority by imposing co-ordination or co-operation.
In line 1a, for instance, a 0 will be noted in the “central government authority” column, since most acts punishable under regulations are issued by central (or regional) government authorities and thus at a level superior to that of local authorities. Generally speaking, however, local powers and responsibilities are assigned to a decentralised local authority or a joint authority, for example.
Similarly, there may be a local security policy implemented by central government authorities, in addition to a local security policy implemented by joint bodies in which local authorities are involved. In this case, there is competition at the local level, which leads to the dimunition of the freedom of action of local authorities in the context of their territorial competence. In this case, -1 is noted in the column 1 which corrects the positive score in the columns listing different types of local body (see below).
In lines 2a to 2d, the existence of restrictions on the powers of members of the local police force, as compared with those of the national force, in the public security field conditions decisions of the local authority beyond traditional modes of supervision (columns 5-7), and will, for example, stand for a dimunition of autonomy, even though such local forces remain in place. Accordingly, half a point is subtracted in respect of autonomy where such restrictions exist. In order to take into consideration such restrictions, the corresponding column on central government authority shall indicate the score -1, which corrects the score on local autonomy determined by the nature of the local authority.
In this competence profile, the degree of local autonomy may, in fact, be assessed according to the nature of the bodies vested with the competences under consideration. The more supervision local authorities exercise over these competences, the higher the degree of autonomy they enjoy; conversely, therefore, the inclusion of local authorities in joint bodies alongside central government implies central government supervision, corresponding to a lesser degree of autonomy. In addition, if some of the powers listed in the lines necessitate simultaneous replies, the table should be supplemented by a memorandum or specific comment.
In order to reflect the degree of supervision local authorities exercise over the competence in question, 1 point is allocated for competences assigned to joint local bodies, 2 points for those assigned to local bodies answerable to local authorities and 3 points where local authorities enjoy direct competence. The impact of supervision is assessed in the same way as for the previous tables: supervision of expediency and subsequent supervision each result in the substraction of one point for autonomy, supervision of legality and subsequent supervision are neutral when it comes to measuring local autonomy, and no supervision (which is never found in the police field) is awarded one point for autonomy.
Where higher-level authorities have the right to take measures in the place and on behalf of local authorities, this may be indicated in column 5. It is nevertheless a form of subsequent supervision, intended to address failure to act on the part of local authorities. It may, however, be triggered on grounds of expediency, where this is allowed by law. This form of supervision directly affects local autonomy, but to varying degrees, depending on its purpose and nature (columns 6 and 7); it is used only in exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, half a point for autonomy is subtracted where such a supervisory power exists (-0.5).
Scoring for table 4:
Column |
Subject |
No. of pts for autonomy |
Comments |
1 |
Central government authority |
0 or -1 |
0 expresses the fact that the powers of these authorities are neutral with regard to local autonomy; the column remains empty if these authorities are not competent. -1 expresses the dimunition of local autonomy by the competition of central government authority. |
2 |
Joint bodies: central government/local authorities |
1 |
Competence is shared |
3 |
Local bodies answerable to local authorities |
2 |
Local autonomy is recognised |
4 |
Local authorities |
3 |
In this case, police matters (depending on the line in question) are a purely local competence |
5 to 7 |
Supervision |
-1 to +1 |
See previous scoring tables |
Total number of points that can be allocated for autonomy |
14 x 3 = 42 points |
The maximum number of points is obtained if the competent authority is always the local authority (column 4): there is no restriction on the powers of members of the local police force as compared with those of the national force, and subsequent supervision of legality is the only form of supervision. It should again be emphasised that the maximum number of points is not necessarily the optimum score. |
Table 4: Police and security competence profile
Authorities and forms of supervision Functions |
Authorities |
Administrative supervision |
|||||
1
|
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
|
Central (regional) government authority |
Joint local bodies: central (regional) government/local authorities |
Local bodies answerable to local authorities |
Local authorities 1) lowest tier (municipalities) 2) higher tier |
Exercised by: a) central government b) regional government c) right to take measures in the place and on behalf of local authorities |
Purpose a) expediency b) legality |
Nature a) prior b) subsequent |
|
1. Legal acts related to policing |
|||||||
a) acts punishable under regulations |
|||||||
b) authorisations whose absence or violation carries penalties |
|||||||
c) power to set penalties within limits laid down by law |
|||||||
d) power to order administrative penalties |
|||||||
2. Public security |
|||||||
a) Local public security policy |
|||||||
b) Power to set up/run a local police force |
|||||||
c) Existence of restrictions on the powers of members of the local police force as compared with those of the national (regional) force |
|||||||
d) Command of local police |
|||||||
3. Emergency services |
|||||||
a) Monitoring of safety standards |
|||||||
b) Maintenance and supply of equipment to the fire service |
|||||||
c) Operational command of emergency services |
|||||||
4. Public health and hygiene Maintenance of an inspection and monitoring service covering: |
|||||||
a) the fitness of housing for occupancy |
|||||||
b) the conservation and use of foodstuffs |
|||||||
c) the purity of water supplied for domestic consumption |
APPENDIX III
EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION
APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TABLES TO FRANCE (MUNICIPALITIES AND EPCIs)
Gérard Marcou
This document experiments with applying the "Analytical tool for assessing the degree of autonomy of first-level local authorities" to France. It must accordingly be read in the light of the explanations given in the latter document. It solely concerns first-level authorities, that is to say municipalities and public establishments for intermunicipal co-operation (EPCIs).
It should be reiterated that the aim is not to describe in full the powers and responsibilities of municipal and intermunicipal bodies, but to assess local autonomy at this level based on fields of competence regarded as significant and instructive. A fair degree of complexity is inevitable, since it must be possible to fit the relevant information concerning countries with very different systems of local government into each table. The tables on the following pages have therefore not been developed specifically for the purpose of describing the French system.
Furthermore, when completing the tables the information has to be simplified to some extent, which sometimes necessitates an interpretation of the legal and practical details. If the tables are to be meaningful, information which is purely hypothetical or of marginal significance must be eliminated, so as to retain only those elements truly indicative of the degree of local competence in terms of either their frequency or their volume.
For each table, the total local autonomy score will be calculated, covering both the material scope of the competences and the scope of local autonomy, i.e. the degree of freedom with which these competences are exercised. The total points scored by French municipalities and their EPCIs will then make it possible to situate them on a scale for each of the tables. Ascribed a basis of 100, the scores could then be added and related one to another in a graphic chart, on x- and y-axes. Their situation could then be compared with those of other countries' municipalities, again for each of the tables.
It will nonetheless be impossible to attempt to determine an overall mark, on account of the different rules used in calculating each of the scores. However, that would doubtless be pointless. One of the advantages of the proposed approach is in point of fact that it makes it possible to compare degrees of local autonomy on the basis of competence profiles which already involve considerable aggregation.
Each table will be accompanied by notes setting out certain items of information essential for an understanding of the French system.
First and foremost, it is necessary to recapitulate the rules governing calculation of the scores:
1) The extra scope of competence point awarded where the competence is mandatory applies only to tables 1 and 2 because most of the competences involve a service provision function.
2) The same applies to the extra point awarded where the competence encompasses management and remuneration of staff.
3) In table 3, column 1 serves solely to measure the scope of the competence. The highest possible number of points is then calculated by multiplying the number of points per column by the number of rows. This convention simplifies matters, but artificially inflates the maximum number of points (169) since, in this table, not all the powers and resources possible (the columns) correspond to all of the functions. For this reason, the number of irrelevant rows must then be deducted for each column. This concerns columns 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10. It results in the deduction of 37 points.
4) Another convention is applied in table 4: the maximum local autonomy score is obtained where a local authority (excluding joint or other bodies distinct from the local authority) exercises all the competences and does not lose a single autonomy point; the competition of competence between a State authority (or a competent regional authority) and a local authority being reflected by the loss of one point of autonomy.
The situation of France's local authorities can then be assessed by adding up the scope of competence points and the autonomy points for each table and comparing the total with the theoretical maximum for the table concerned. This gives an approximate idea of the degree of decentralisation, and above all, in the light of the conventions applied in calculating the different scores, permits a comparison to be drawn between countries. No country will attain the maximum theoretical score per table, but those which are the most decentralised, as regards a given level of local authority, will obtain a higher score than the least decentralised. The countries' relative positions may vary according to the competence profile. It must again be said that the degree of decentralisation is not a measure of the quality or the performance of the functions taken into account in this analysis.
Tables 1 to 4 show that the highest autonomy scores are obtained for optional competences financed with the local authorities' own resources, but these are not necessarily the most important competences in terms of public policy, budgetary appropriations or the number of staff. This finding is normal. It is for this reason that the tables seek to reflect both the scope of the competence and the degree of autonomy with which the various functions are exercised.
Table 0 below summarises the results of this appraisal, showing the scores obtained for each of tables 1 to 4. To this end, it gives, for each table, the number of scope of competence points, the number of autonomy points and the total obtained by adding the two together, in terms firstly of the theoretical maximum score and secondly of the score obtained by France's municipal authorities.
Table 0: Summary of the scores obtained by France's municipalities for tables 1 to 4
Scope of competence: number of points |
Autonomy points |
Total (basis of 100) |
||||
Competences (number of rows completed) |
Extra points (obligatory competences) |
Extra points (competence in staff matters) |
Sub-total |
|||
Table 1 - France |
22 11 |
22 2 |
20 9.5 |
64 100 22.5 31.5 |
352 100 92 26.1 |
100 28.8 |
Table 2 - France |
29 26 |
29 11 |
25 20 |
83 100 57 68.7 |
464 100 214 46.1 |
100 58.4 |
Table 3 - France |
13 11 |
n n |
n n |
13 100 11 83.6 |
132 100 56 42.4 |
100 63 |
Table 4 - France |
13 7 |
n n |
n n |
13 100 7 53.8 |
42 100 20,5 48.8 |
100 51.3 |
Regardless of any comparison with other countries, if France's score is set against the theoretical maximum number of points, this summary table already shows that, in France, the degree of decentralisation is higher for the competences of the economic profile than for those of the social profile. The scores for tables 3 and 4 are calculated on a different basis, which makes it difficult to compare them with those for tables 1 and 2 without taking into consideration the situation of other countries. However, the level of decentralisation seems to be approximately the same for the town planning and environment profile and the police and public order profile. This assessment probably understates the degree of decentralisation in France in the sphere of town planning and the environment, as compared with the latter profile. The decentralisation does, however, appear more important for the town planning and environment competence profile than for the police and public order profile.
Table 1: Social competence profile
Constraints, powers and resources Functions |
Sharing of competence |
Powers and resources |
|||||||||||||
1
|
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
14 |
15 |
|
Deconcentrated gov-ernment departments (federated state or region in some countries) |
Non-ministerial body under state (or regional government) control |
Other local authority |
Type of competence a) delegated b) own, obligatory c) own, optional |
Regulatory power a) organisation b)procedure c) standards d)rights |
Individual decisions a) bound b) discretionary |
Planning |
Management and allocation of resources a) facilities b) staff |
Choice of form of management (yes/no) |
Delegation to the private sector/by the state a)legal obligation b)option |
Funding a) earmarked b)charge-based via outside body c) general budget |
Funding a)power in tax matters b)price-setting by local authority |
Supervision a) expediency b) lawfulness |
Supervision a) prior b) subsequent |
Co-operation agreement a) obligation b) option |
|
1.Public health |
|||||||||||||||
-preventive services |
|||||||||||||||
-outpatient care |
3 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
n |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|||
-hospitals |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
2.Social services and benefits |
|||||||||||||||
-family |
|||||||||||||||
-children (welfare, accommodation) |
|||||||||||||||
-elderly |
|||||||||||||||
-disabled |
|||||||||||||||
-minimum income |
|||||||||||||||
-integration |
-1 |
-1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
-assistance (relief) |
-1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
n |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
3.Education |
|||||||||||||||
-primary |
-1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1½ |
0 |
n |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
-secondary |
|||||||||||||||
-compulsory |
|||||||||||||||
-vocational |
|||||||||||||||
-special (children with disabilities) |
|||||||||||||||
4.Culture |
|||||||||||||||
-arts education |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
n |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
-museums |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
n |
2 |
2 |
-1 |
-1 |
0 |
|
-libraries |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
n |
2 |
2 |
-1 |
-1 |
0 |
|
-protection / conser-vation |
|||||||||||||||
-theatres, entertainment |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
5.Sport and leisure |
|||||||||||||||
-sports facilities |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
-leisure centres |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
NB:
Table 2: Economic competence profile
Constraints, powers and resources Functions |
Sharing of competence |
Powers and resources |
|||||||||||||
1
|
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
14 |
15 |
|
Deconcentrated gov-ernment departments (federated state or region in some countries) |
Non-ministerial body under state (or regional government) control |
Other local authority |
Type of competence a) delegated b) own, obligatory c) own, optional |
Regulatory power a) organisation b)procedure c) standards d)rights |
Individual decisions a) bound b) discretionary |
Planning |
Management and allocation of resources a) facilities b) staff |
Choice of form of management (yes/no) |
Delegation to the private sector/by the state a)legal obligation b)option |
Funding a) earmarked b)charge-based via outside body c) general budget |
Funding a)power in tax matters b) price-setting by local authority |
Supervision a) expediency b) lawfulness |
Supervision a) prior b) subsequent |
Co-operation agreement a) obligation b) option |
|
1. Services to households |
|||||||||||||||
-water |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
- drainage and sewerage |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
-household refuse; disposal |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
- household refuse; treatment |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
n |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
- district heating |
3 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|||
- telecom networks |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
2. Funerals and burials |
|||||||||||||||
- funeral services provision |
2 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
N |
|||
- cemeteries |
2 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
N |
|||
3.Energy - electricity *production/supply *renewables *distribution |
0 |
3 2 |
1 1 |
1 1 |
0 1 |
2 1 |
1 0 |
n 0 |
1 1 |
1 1 |
0 0 |
0 0 |
n n |
||
- gas * supply *distribution |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
- energy conservation |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
4. Roads |
|
||||||||||||||
- building, maintenance, use |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
|||
- vehicle parking |
3 |
2 |
n |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|||
- street lighting |
3 |
1 |
n |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
N |
|||
- management of public property |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
n |
1 |
1 |
n |
n |
0 |
0 |
N |
|||
5. Public transport |
|||||||||||||||
- urban transport |
0 |
3 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
||
- interurban transport |
|||||||||||||||
- regional links |
|||||||||||||||
6.Housing |
|||||||||||||||
- general |
-1 |
-1 |
2 |
2 |
n |
1 |
n |
n |
n |
n |
n |
0 |
0 |
N |
|
- social, building and management |
-1 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
n |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
|
- social, allocation |
-1 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
n |
n |
0 |
n |
n |
n |
0 |
0 |
N |
||
7. Measures to promote economic development |
|||||||||||||||
-aid to businesses |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
n |
0 |
n |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
|
-provision of sites |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
n |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
|
-economic infrastructure * ports, airports *other |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
2 |
n |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
|
-services to businesses (industrial waste disposal, etc.) |
0 |
-1 |
3 |
2 |
n |
n |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
NB:
Table°3: Town planning and environment competence profile
Constraints, powers and resources Functions |
Context |
Powers and resources |
Administrative supervision |
||||||||||
1
|
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
|
Existence of a material competence at municipal level |
Existence of derogation procedures under central/ regional supervision a) exceptional b) occasional |
Existence of a binding development plan adopted by a higher authority a)principle b)exception |
Type of competence a) own, optional b) own, obligatory c) delegated d) power to devise/propose |
Design/research/planning bodies under local supervision |
Relationship between planning permission and plan a) Obligation to comply b) Discretion enjoyed |
Performance of functions a) Local administration: obligatory b) Delegation to private sector: possible |
Co-operation agreements a) between public entities b) with operators |
Funding a) earmarked grant from higher authority b) municipality's general budget |
Funding by rights holders a) planning permission (or declaration) fees b) builders c) owners |
By: a)central government b) regional government c) general d) specific |
Purpose: a) expediency b) lawfulness |
Nature: a)prior b)ongoing c)subsequent |
|
1. Plans |
|||||||||||||
Land use, structural or strategic plan |
1 |
b -0.5 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
a,c 0 |
b, 0 |
b,c 0 |
||||
Local plan enforceable against granting planning permission |
1 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
a,c 0 |
b,0 |
c 0 |
|||||
Detailed plan |
|||||||||||||
2. Permits |
|||||||||||||
-to develop |
|||||||||||||
- to divide land into lots |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
a,c 0 |
b,0 |
c 0 |
|||||
-to build |
1 |
a -0.5 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
a,c 0 |
b,0 |
c 0 |
||||
-to demolish |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
a,c 0 |
b,0 |
a -1 |
||||||
3. Land measures |
|||||||||||||
-expropriation |
1 |
3 |
1 |
a,c 0 |
b,0 |
a -1 |
|||||||
-right of pre-emption |
1 |
3 |
1 |
a,c 0 |
b,0 |
c 0 |
|||||||
-redistribution of urban land |
1 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
|||||||||
4. Development |
|
||||||||||||
-roads and services |
1 |
a -0.5 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
a,c 0 |
b,0 |
c 0 |
||||
- amenities and sale of land |
1 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
a,c 0 |
b,0 |
c 0 |
|||||
5. Creation and maintenance of environmental/urban protection areas |
1 |
b -0.5 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
a,c,d 0 |
b, 0 |
b,c 0 |
NB:
Table 4: Police and public order competence profile
Authorities and supervision Functions |
Authorities |
Administrative supervision |
|||||
1
|
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
|
Authority belonging to central government |
Joint body at local level: central |
Local body answerable to a local authority |
Local authority: 1) base level (municipality)
|
By: a)Central government
c) Substitute authority |
Purpose: a) expediency b) lawfulness |
Nature: a)prior b)subsequent |
|
1. Legal acts related to policing |
|||||||
a) acts punishable under regulations |
0 |
3 |
-0.5 |
0 |
0 |
||
b) authorisations whose absence or violation carries penalties |
0 |
3 |
-0.5 |
0 |
0 |
||
c) power to set penalties within limits laid down by law |
0 |
0 |
|||||
d) power to order administrative penalties |
0 |
0 |
|||||
2. Public security |
|||||||
a) Local public security policy |
0 |
1 |
|||||
b) Power to set up/run a local police force |
3 |
0 |
0 |
||||
c) Existence of restrictions on the powers of members of the local police force as compared with those of the national (regional) force |
|||||||
d) Command of local police |
3 |
0 |
0 |
||||
3. Emergency services |
|||||||
a) Monitoring of safety standards |
0 |
||||||
b) Maintenance and supply of equipment to the fire service |
(département) |
||||||
c) Operational command of emergency services |
0 |
||||||
4. Public health and hygiene Maintenance of an inspection and monitoring service covering: |
|||||||
a) the fitness of housing for occupancy |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
|||
b) the conservation and use of foodstuffs |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
|||
c) the purity of water supplied for domestic consumption |
0 |
NB: